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SUSPECTED TERRORISTS’ RIGHTS BETWEEN 
THE FRAGMENTATION AND MERGER OF 
LEGAL ORDERS: REFLECTIONS IN THE 
MARGIN OF THE KADI ECJ APPEAL JUDGMENT  
CARMEN DRAGHICI

 
In a time of non-conventional global threats evocatively characterized 
as ―the age of terror,‖1 the United Nations (―U.N.‖) and regional 
organizations are expected to address compelling security demands 
efficiently while at the same time preserving the fundamental human 
rights of alleged terrorists. How to achieve a fair compromise between 
such critical objectives is no new dilemma, as states have faced it 
individually in their endeavors against domestic terrorism. However, in the 
framework of international action, the impasse is compounded by the 
interplay between the multiple institutional actors and sources of law 
involved. In fact, the delegation by states of extensive mandatory powers 
to intergovernmental organizations has caused international law to pervade 
into municipal legal systems, and there is an increased use of international 
norms by domestic courts.
2
 The law-making process within international 
organizations is no longer limited to the regulation of inter-state relations, 
but also results in the production of rights, obligations, and sanctions for 
private persons.
3
 Perhaps in that sense international law can no longer be 
 
 
  Lecturer in Law, City Law School, City University London (U.K.); PhD in International Law 
and Human Rights, University of Rome ‗La Sapienza‘ (Italy). This Article has been written as part of a 
wider research project undertaken as a Leverhulme Visiting Post-doctoral Research Fellow at the 
Centre on Human Rights in Conflict, School of Law, University of East London in 2008. The author 
acknowledges the invaluable support of the Leverhulme Trust, and is grateful to Prof. Chandra Lekha 
Sriram, Dr. Olga Martin-Ortega and Ms. Johanna Herman (Centre on Human Rights in Conflict, 
University of East London), and to Prof. Raffaele Cadin (University of Rome ‗La Sapienza‘) for their 
helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
 1. See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the 
Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675 (2004). 
 2. See Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and 
International Law by National Courts, 102 AM. J. INT‘L L. 241 (2008); Melissa A. Waters, Creeping 
Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 628 (2007); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. 
INT‘L L. 43 (2004); Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 
98 AM. J. INT‘L L. 82 (2004).  
 3. While international organizations are typically vested with mere recommendatory powers, in 
some cases they can adopt mandatory decisions to prescribe courses of action having a bearing on the 
life of private and legal persons in member States. The paradigmatic example is that of European 
Union legislative acts, especially within the framework of the Community pillar, but other such 
instances can be found in international practice: the international standards and procedures adopted by 
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accurately described as the ―law of nations,‖ insofar as it is also becoming 
a law for individuals. The U.N. sanctions targeting private persons 
suspected of association with terrorist organizations of global reach 
illustrate the direct bearing of international activity on the life of national 
communities and individual subjects.  
An unexpected clash between U.N. collective security action and 
human rights standards has grown from the de facto expansion of the 
Security Council‘s post-9/11 prerogatives to an extent hardly foreseeable 
by the drafters of the U.N. Charter (―Charter‖). Arguably, from a 
―policeman‖ of the international community of states, the Security Council 
(―Council‖) is developing into a world law-enforcement super-structure, 
using its mandatory Chapter VII powers to take measures immediately 
impacting the situation of private individuals rather than states.
4
 We are 
witnessing an unprecedented merger of traditionally distinct legal orders, 
domestic and international. Nonetheless, supporters of monism should not 
be deluded: as emphasized below, the disorderly expansion of 
international law, through the multiplication of decision-making fora 
outside a coherent hierarchic system, often determines a sharp divide. 
Within this intricate normative context, the role of the judiciary in 
delimiting admissible qualifications of human rights by national and 
international authoritative bodies is an increasingly arduous one. 
Thus, the legal developments alluded to above raise the question of 
whether U.N. Security Council determinations (in particular the inclusion 
of a name on the ―blacklists‖ of alleged terrorists) can be challenged in a 
court of law (a domestic court or a supra-national tribunal established by a 
treaty mechanism or by a regional international organization). The hesitant 
reaction of the judicature to this query is discernible in the case law of the 
European Community (―EC‖) courts on European Union (―EU‖) financial 
measures against suspected terrorists adopted in the furtherance of U.N. 
Security Council sanctions.  
This Article briefly describes the human rights challenges entailed by 
the U.N. and EU individual financial sanctions, particularly from the 
 
 
the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (see Articles 37, 54 lett. (l), and 90 of the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation), the regulations adopted by the Health Assembly of the 
World Health Organization (see Articles 21 and 22 of WHO Constitution), etc. Moreover, as this 
article argues, in recent years analogous effects have been brought about by highly controversial U.N. 
Security Council decisions leading to the adoption of the targeted sanctions discussed below. 
 4. See Ian Johnstone, Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council: Bringing Down 
the Deliberative Deficit, 102 AM. J. INT‘L L. 275 (2008); Nico Krisch, The Rise and Fall of Collective 
Security: Terrorism, US Hegemony, and the Plight of the Security Council, in TERRORISM AS A 
CHALLENGE FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: SECURITY VERSUS LIBERTY? 879, 881, 887 
(Christian Walter et al. eds., 2004).  
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viewpoint of access to justice. It then explores the early tendencies of the 
Court of First Instance (―CFI‖) in dealing with complaints from 
individuals included on EU-incorporated U.N. lists, as opposed to 
autonomous EU proscription lists. It discusses the two parallel sets of 
cases and the double standards in the protection of suspects‘ rights 
resulting from excessive deference to the Security Council. Against this 
background, the article subsequently analyzes the recent judgment of the 
European Court of Justice (―ECJ‖) on the Kadi appeal case of 3 September 
2008.
5
 The significant shift in jurisprudence signaled by the Kadi 
judgment is the starting point for new reflections on the fragmentation and 
merger of the legal phenomena in the post-modern world, and on the place 
of human rights and the rule of law principle in the value system of the 
international community. 
I. PUNISHMENT WITHOUT A CRIME? U.N. FINANCIAL SANCTIONS 
AGAINST SUSPECTED TERRORISTS AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
The procedures at the core of the blacklisting mechanism have attracted 
significant criticism from academics, human rights activists, and 
governments.
6
 At first glance, the imposition of capital-freezing measures 
by the Security Council is consistent with the widely saluted replacement 
 
 
 5. Case C-402/05 P, Kadi v. Council of the European Union, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351. 
 6. See Iain Cameron, UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the European Convention 
on Human Rights, 72 NORDIC J. INT‘L L. 159 (2003); Anja Seibert-Fohr, The Relevance of 
International Human Rights Standards for Prosecuting Terrorists, in TERRORISM AS A CHALLENGE 
FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: SECURITY VERSUS LIBERTY? 125, 126 (Christian Walter et 
al. eds., 2004); Raffaele Cadin, Le „liste nere‟ del Consiglio di sicurezza e il loro recepimento da parte 
dell‟Unione europea: Quali rimedi per i sospetti terroristi?, in MIGRAZIONE E TERRORISMO: DUE 
FENOMENI IMPROPRIAMENTE ABBINATI 115 (Maria Rita Saulle & Luigino Manca eds., 2006); Iain 
Cameron, The European Convention on Human Rights, Due Process and United Nations Security 
Council Counter-Terrorism Sanctions, Report prepared for the Council of Europe on 6 February 2006, 
(2006), available at http://www.coe.int (search ―report Cameron‖ and click on the fifth result); Enzo 
Cannizzaro, A Machiavellian Moment? The UN Security Council and the Rule of Law, 3 INT‘L ORG. L. 
REV. 189 (2006); Bill Bowring, Background Paper, The Human Rights Implications of International 
Listing Mechanisms for „Terrorist‟ Organizations, in U.N. OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS [ODIHR] AND U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
[OHCHR] EXPERT WORKSHOP ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN 
COUNTER-TERRORISM: FINAL REPORT 75–113 (Feb. 21, 2007); Bardo Fassbender, Targeted Sanctions 
Imposed by the UN Security Council and Due Process Rights: A Study Commissioned by the UN 
Office of Legal Affairs and Follow-up Action by the United Nations, 3 INT‘L ORG. L. REV. 437 (2006); 
Thomas J. Biersteker & Sue E. Eckert, Strengthening Targeted Sanctions Through Fair and Clear 
Procedures (The Watson Inst. for Int‘l Stud. Targeted Sanctions Project, Brown Univ., White Paper, 
Mar. 30, 2006). See also 2005 World Summit Outcome, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005) (―We 
also call upon the Security Council, with the support of the Secretary-General, to ensure that fair and 
clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for removing them, as 
well as for granting humanitarian exemptions.‖). 
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of general non-military coercive measures with ―selective‖ sanctions, 
targeting only the political or military leadership of a regime rather than 
whole populations.
7
 However, a more careful examination shows that this 
is hardly the case. Unlike the targeted sanctions adopted in response to the 
situation in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Iraq, D.R. Congo, Côte 
d‘Ivoire, or Sudan,8 the sanctions introduced by Resolution 1390 (2002) 
against Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaida members, the Taliban, ―and other 
individuals or entities associated with them‖9 address a new type of global 
and virtually permanent threat, and their termination is not contingent 
upon the achievement of an immediate political goal.
10
 More importantly, 
the focus of the collective security mechanism has shifted towards private 
 
 
 7. See August Reinisch, Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of 
the Security Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT‘L L. 851, 851–52, 
(2001).  
 8. After the pioneer Security Council Resolution (―Resolution‖) 1127 of 1997 imposing travel 
sanctions on UNITA leaders, S.C. Res. 1127, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1127 (Aug. 28, 1997), 
complemented by Resolutions 1173 and 1176 of 1998 deciding financial sanctions on UNITA 
members, S.C. Res. 1173, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1173 (June 12, 1998); S.C. Res. 1176, U.N. Doc 
S/RES/1176, targeted measures were adopted in reaction to the situation in Sierra Leone, S.C. Res. 
1132, ¶¶ 5, 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (Oct.8, 1997); S.C. Res. 1171, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1171 
(June 5, 1998), Liberia, S.C. Res. 1306, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1306 (July 5, 2000); S.C. Res. 1343, ¶¶ 2, 7, 
14 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1343 (Mar. 7, 2001); S.C. Res. 1521, ¶¶ 4, 18, 19, 21, 22, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1521 
(Dec. 22, 2003); S.C. Res. 1532, ¶¶ 1, 4, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1532 (Mar. 12, 2004), Iraq, S.C. Res. 
1483, ¶¶ 19, 23, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); S.C. Res. 1518, ¶¶ 1, 2, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1518 (Nov. 24, 2003), Democratic Republic of Congo, S.C. Res. 1493, ¶ 20 U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1493 (July 28, 2003); S.C. Res. 1596, ¶¶ 13, 15, 18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1596 (May 3, 2005); 
S.C. Res. 1649, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1649 (Dec. 21, 2005), Côte d‘Ivoire, S.C. Res. 1572, ¶¶ 9, 11, 
14 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1572 (Nov. 15, (2004); S.C. Res. 1643, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1643 (Dec. 15, 
2005), Sudan, S.C. Res. 1591, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1591 (Mar. 29, 2005); S.C. Res.1672, ¶ 1, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1672 (Apr. 25, 2006).  
 9. This resolution extends the sphere of application of the sanctions initially decided under 
Resolution 1267 (1999) against Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban. S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999). Under paragraph 2(a) of Resolution 1390, U.N. Member States were 
required to  
[f]reeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic resources of these 
individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, including funds derived from property owned 
or controlled, directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their 
direction, and ensure that neither these nor any other funds, financial assets or economic 
resources are made available, directly or indirectly, for such persons‘ benefit, by their 
nationals or by any persons within their territory.  
S.C. Res. 1390, ¶ 2(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 28, 2002). These obligations were reiterated by 
Resolutions 1452 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1735 (2006), and 1822 (2008). See 
S.C. Res. 1452, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1452 (Dec. 20, 2002); S.C. Res. 1455, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1455 (Jan. 
17, 2003); S.C. Res. 1526, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526 (Jan. 30, 2004); S.C. Res. 1617, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005); S.C. Res. 1735, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1735 (Dec. 22, 2006); S.C. Res. 1822, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1822 (June 30, 2008). 
 10. See Cameron, UN Targeted Sanctions, supra note 6, at 164: ―Resolution 1390 is ‗open-
ended‘ and so involves a qualitative difference in that there is no connection between the targeted 
groups/individuals and any territory or state.‖  
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individuals, whose ―association‖ with terrorism is difficult to ascertain,11 
and all the more so in the presence of secretive organizations.
12
 Sanctions 
against persons belonging to the public sphere (regime leaders or armed 
rebels), in response to patent, uncontroversial conduct, and intended to 
constrain the targeted individuals to adopt a certain course of action, are 
very different from sanctions adopted against mere suspects of no public 
notoriety and based on unreliable intelligence material, speculating on any 
kind of ―association‖ at the will of the executives. In using this scheme, 
the Security Council has started to perform global law-enforcement tasks, 
except no specific laws define the relevant crimes, and no court assesses 
guilt prior to the infliction of sanctions.  
In fact, the Sanctions Committee (―Committee‖) established by the 
Security Council to that end
13
 receives proposals by Member States 
(―States‖), mostly justified by confidential intelligence material,14 and 
 
 
 11. The resolutions enabling the blacklisting mechanism, including the most recent, Resolution 
1822 (2008), leave excessive room for arbitrary conduct by the executive branches, insofar as an 
individual or group can be found to be associated with Al-Qaida or the Taliban if, among other things, 
he or she ―otherwise support[s] [their] acts or activities.‖ S.C. Res. 1822, ¶ 2(d), U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1822 (June 30, 2008) (emphasis added). The assessment is not made by impartial tribunals. 
Some criteria for association are laid down by Resolution 1617 (2005):  
[The Security Council] further decides that acts or activities indicating that an individual, 
group, undertaking, or entity is ―associated with‖ Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban 
include:—participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of 
acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of;—
supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to;—recruiting for; or—otherwise 
supporting acts or activities of; Al-Qaida, [O]sama bin Laden or the Taliban, or any cell, 
affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof. 
S.C. Res. 1617, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005). As this provision indicates, the criteria for 
―association‖ are extremely broad. 
 12. See Cameron, UN Targeted Sanctions, supra note 6, at 165–66, 168–70; Cadin, supra note 6. 
 13. The functions of the ―Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee‖ or ―1267 Committee,‖ 
one of the various Sanctions Committees established by the Security Council ratione materiae, were 
decided by Resolution 1267 (1999) and subsequently modified by Resolutions 1390 (2002), 1526 
(2004), and 1617 (2005). See S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1390, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 28, 2002); S.C. Res. 1526, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526 (Jan. 30, 2004); S.C. 
Res. 1617, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005). 
 14.  
As regards terrorist suspects, secret intelligence material can be assumed almost invariably to 
lie behind the listing . . . . On the occasions in which a sanctions committee member has 
asked a designating state for the basis of a particular blacklisting to be disclosed, and this 
basis is intelligence or diplomatic material, the reply has been given that the information 
comes from a reliable source, but that national security considerations rule out disclosing it. 
. . . Thus, the sanctions committees as such have rarely, or ever, evaluated the ―evidence‖ that 
the named person is engaged in activities involving a threat to international peace and 
security. 
IAIN CAMERON, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, DUE PROCESS AND UNITED 
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL COUNTER-TERRORISM SANCTIONS, REPORT PREPARED FOR THE 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, FEB. 6, 2006, at 5 (2006), http://www.coe.int/t/f/affaires_juridiques/coop% 
  
 
 
 
 
632 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 8:627 
 
 
 
 
draws a list of suspected persons and associations whose funds are to be 
frozen by States having jurisdiction thereover. Some evidentiary 
information is required for designating States to submit to the other States 
in the Committee,
15
 but, according to the Guidelines of the Sanctions 
Committee on listing proposals by States (―Guidelines‖), ―[a] criminal 
charge or conviction is not necessary for inclusion on the Consolidated 
List as the sanctions are intended to be preventive in nature.‖16  
Furthermore, the working Guidelines do not envisage the prompt 
notification of the proscribed individuals by the Sanctions Committee as to 
the reasons for their inclusion on the list. It is true that the problem of 
secrecy has been addressed, to a certain extent, by Resolution 1735 
(2006), which now requires the States directly concerned by the decision 
(the State where the individual is located and the State of nationality) to 
notify the listed subjects of the designation, of the reasons for designation 
(limited to publicly disclosable information), of the effects of the 
designation, and of the de-listing procedures.
17
 The Guidelines of the 
Committee establish no obligation of notification for the Committee itself 
and only foresee a gentle reminder the Secretariat is to address to the 
States concerned (who are obliged to proceed to notification by virtue of 
Resolution 1735).
18
 One aspect worth noticing is that it is up to the 
 
 
E9ration_juridique/droit_international_public/Textes_&_documents/2006/I.%20Cameron%20Report
%2006.pdf. 
 Resolution 1617 began to address criticism for the lack of transparency of the blacklisting 
procedure, providing the release of some information. S.C. Res. 1617, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 
(July 29, 2005). Further reform was sought through Resolution 1735. S.C. Res. 1735, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1735 (Dec. 22, 2006).  
 15. See Guidelines of the [Sanctions] Committee for the Conduct of Its Work (Adopted on 7 
November 2002, as amended on 10 April 2003, 21 December 2005, 29 November 2006, 12 February 
2007, and 9 December 2008), at point 6 lett. (d) [hereinafter Guidelines], available at 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/1267_ guidelines.pdf. 
 16. Id. at point 6 lett. (c). See also paragraph 10 of the preamble to Resolution 1735 (2006), in 
which the measures decided by the Security Council are said to be preventative and independent from 
criminal rules under domestic legislations. However, see the perplexities of the Analytical Support and 
Monitoring Team in its Fourth Report, S/2006/154 of 10 March 2006, ¶ 49. 
 17.  Resolution 1735 (2006) calls upon the State where the individual is located and the State of 
nationality  
to take reasonable steps according to their domestic laws and practices to notify or inform the 
listed individual or entity of the designation and to include with this notification a copy of the 
publicly releasable portion of the statement of case, a description of the effects of designation 
. . . , the Committee‘s procedures for considering delisting requests . . . . 
S.C. Res. 1735, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1735 (Dec. 22, 2006). 
 18. In fact, the Secretariat notifies and ―remind[s]‖ such State(s) to inform the individuals of the 
measure, of listing and de-listing procedures, attaching ―a copy of the publicly releasable portion of the 
statement of case, a description of the effects of the designation . . . , the Committee‘s procedures for 
considering delisting requests‖ and humanitarian exceptions provisions. See Guidelines, supra note 15, 
at point 6 letter (j). 
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designating State(s) to indicate what portion(s) of the statement of the case 
(in support of a proposed listing) the Committee may publicly release or 
release to Member States upon request.
19
 In addition, the selective 
notification as to the statement of the case does not involve access of the 
individual to the file, and thus to the specific pieces of evidence. 
A further, and more troubling, pitfall of blacklisting is that the 
Guidelines do not establish a procedure enabling the individuals concerned 
to challenge the allegations and evidence against them before an 
independent body. The proscribed individuals do not have a proper right 
to contest a listing decision and obtain the re-examination of their case. 
Re-examination with a view to cancellation from the list is actually only a 
mere possibility. Following a weak reform of the mechanism pursuant to 
Resolution 1730 (2006),
20
 individuals can now file a petition with the focal 
point for de-listing within the U.N. Secretariat.
21
 However, after the 
petition has been filed, re-examination depends on the discretionary 
intercession of a State in the Sanctions Committee willing to bring the 
issue on the body‘s agenda.22 Thus, the direct petitioning system 
introduced by Resolution 1730 (2006) does not eliminate the critical 
aspects of the mechanism in terms of defense rights: (a) no review process 
is guaranteed—de-listing consultations cannot be started without the 
initiative of a State in the Committee, and such initiative is left at the 
 
 
 19. See id. at point 6 lett. (d). 
 20. Resolution 1730 has very limited achievements: formal accession of individuals to the de-
listing procedure (which remains inter-governmental in nature), and the possibility for States other 
than the State of nationality or residence to place the case on the Committee‘s agenda. S.C. Res. 1730, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1730 (Dec. 19, 2006). In addition, it introduces a further element of concern: while 
the procedure ex Res. 1730 (2006) was thought of as an alternative to the intervention of the States of 
nationality, such States are allowed to establish the compulsory (and exclusive) petitioning to the focal 
point, with the result that governments may elude the scrutiny of domestic courts over abusive refusal 
to address the Sanctions Committee for de-listing. See Maurizio Arcari, Sviluppi in tema di tutela dei 
diritti di individui iscritti nelle liste dei comitati delle sanzioni del Consiglio di sicurezza, in 90 
RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 657, 662–64 (2006).  
 21. This option was only recently opened to proscribed individuals by Resolution 1730, which 
established a focal point where de-listing requests from individuals can be filed. S.C. Res. 1730, supra 
note 20. Prior to that, the initiative of the State of nationality or residence was required in order for the 
Sanctions Committee to consider the cancellation of a name from the list. This procedure presented the 
typical flaws of the institution of diplomatic protection, insofar as the individual depended on the 
State‘s willingness to take the de-listing initiative, and States are generally moved by considerations of 
political opportunity. For a critical description of the mechanism in place before Resolution 1730 
(2006), see Cameron, UN Targeted Sanctions, supra note 6, at 176–77.  
 22. The focal point for de-listing has the limited task of forwarding the requests for information 
and comments to the designating government(s) and government(s) of residence and citizenship, 
which, after consultations, may call for the request to be placed on the Committee‘s agenda; if none of 
these governments takes action, the focal point notifies the request to all States, and the initiative of 
one member is sufficient to place the issue on the Committee‘s agenda. See S.C. Res. 1730, supra note 
21, at points 5–6 of the ―De-listing procedure‖ annexed document.  
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discretion of States; (b) no independent third-party is authorized to control 
the accuracy of the Committee‘s determinations and adopt a de-listing 
decision: the same body, the Sanctions Committee—incidentally, a 
political body—, decides to include an individual on the list, and revises 
the decision; and (c) the individual is not entitled to participate in and 
argue his or her case during the proceedings.  
This sanctions system opens the door to a scenario in which suspects 
find themselves deprived of any financial resources and ineligible for 
future payments for an indefinite duration, without having been charged 
with any offense whatsoever, or enabled to challenge the relevant decision. 
Against this background, the question almost suggests itself: is this 
punishment without a crime? In the light of its duration and far-reaching 
effects, funds-freezing resembles a criminal penalty,
23
 and, in any legal 
order based on the rule of law,
24
 such a punishment should only be 
inflicted after a tribunal has irrevocably determined guilt. 
Now, the freezing of funds has been described by the Security 
Council‘s Sanctions Committee as a preventive administrative measure 
rather than a penalty.
25
 However, as the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights (―ECHR‖) indicates, the notion of ―criminal‖ charge is 
determined not only by the legal classification of the offense, but also by 
the nature and severity of the possible penalty.
26
 The effect of inclusion on 
the proscription list is long-term deprivation of any current or prospective 
financial assets,
27
 and heavily impacts the moral and economic credibility 
 
 
 23. On the punitive character of the funds-freezing measures, see ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER 
VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 352–53 (2004). 
 24. Undoubtedly, upholding the rule of law is amongst the programmatic objectives of the 
United Nations, and arguably an obligation to adopt measures consistent with the rule of law binds the 
organs of the organization, at least by virtue of the good faith principle. See id. at 195–98; DAVID 
SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN 
CHARTER (LEGAL LIMITS AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE) 163–285 
(2001). 
 25. See Letter dated 2 September 2005 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida, the Taliban, and associated 
individuals and entities (―1267 Committee‖), addressed to the President of the Security Council, ¶¶ 37, 
41, U.N. Doc. S/2005/572 (Sept. 9, 2005) (―The sanctions are intended as a deterrent as well as a set of 
preventative measures . . . . [T]he sanctions do not impose a criminal punishment or procedure, such as 
detention, arrest or extradition, but instead apply administrative measures such as freezing assets 
. . . .‖). See also Guidelines, supra note 15, at point 6 lett. (c). 
 26. See Engel v. The Netherlands, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (1976); Putz v. Austria, 1996-I 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 312, 324 (1996); Pierre-Bloch v. France, 1997-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2206, 2224–2226 
(1997). 
 27. Only limited ―humanitarian‖ exceptions are permitted. See S.C. Res. 1452, ¶ 1(a), U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1452 (Dec. 20, 2002) (outlining terms in which States may release a limited amount of funds to 
enable the targeted individual to satisfy some basic needs, such as aliments, lodging expenses, medical 
care, etc.). 
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of those listed,
28
 and therefore could arguably be considered as the 
equivalent of a criminal sanction. Further, according to the same 
prominent jurisprudence, a person is considered to be ―charged‖ when the 
authorities take measures implying an allegation that he or she has 
committed a criminal offense, and substantially affecting the situation of 
the suspect.
29
 Such an implication is undoubtedly present in the inclusion 
of a name on the proscription list and in the adoption/maintenance of the 
freezing measure. Alternatively, if being placed on the list does not imply 
a criminal charge, a person has, in any event, a right of access to a judge in 
a dispute over any civil rights, such as many of the rights at stake for 
persons listed as alleged terrorists or supporters of terrorism: right to 
private life, reputation, or enjoyment of property.
30
  
The U.N. terrorism blacklisting mechanism fails to secure the defense 
rights of suspects, and consequently all other rights are possibly infringed. 
Unsurprisingly, this situation has led to litigation before national and 
regional courts. 
II. LOST BETWEEN JURISDICTIONS: CFI PARALLEL CASE LAW ON U.N. 
AND EU BLACKLISTS AND THE DOUBLE STANDARDS IN THE PROTECTION 
OF SUSPECTS‘ RIGHTS 
Judicial review of global counter-terrorism measures is an area in 
which the lack of coordination between jurisdictions particularly affects 
the prospective outcome of claims by alleged terrorists. This remark is 
 
 
 28. The social stigma, as well as the economic consequences flowing from the lack of moral and 
financial credibility, should not be underestimated. See Cameron, UN Targeted Sanctions, supra note 
6, at 171–72; C. Eckes, How Not Being Sanctioned by a Community Instrument Infringes a Person‟s 
Fundamental Rights: The Case of SEGI, in 17 THE KING‘S C. L.J. 144, 150–51 (2006). The social 
impact has been, however, oddly minimized by the ECHR. See SEGI v. 15 States of the European 
Union, ECHR decision of 23 May 2002, ¶ 6, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-
en (search HUDOC collection for ―App. No. 9916/02,‖ then follow ―SEGI and others‖ hyperlink). 
 29. See Foti v. Italy, 56 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1982). The publication of a warrant, search 
of premises or persons, and other activities with direct effect on the individual can be considered to 
indicate that he or she is alleged to have committed an offense. 
 30. An individual‘s right to court ―in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of 
any criminal charge‖ has also been widely discussed by the European Court of Strasbourg. In the 
landmark case Ringeisen v. Austria, the court clarified that the expression ―civil rights and obligations‖ 
is to be given a broad interpretation as to cover all proceedings that determine private rights and 
obligations, whatever the character of applicable legislation and irrespective of the competent 
authority. See Ringeisen v. Austria, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 39 (1971). Almost all rights set forth 
by domestic law (including those that are not conventionally guaranteed) are considered ―civil rights,‖ 
such as the right to enjoy honor and a good reputation. See Kurzac v. Poland, ECHR judgment of 22 
Feb. 2001, ¶ 20, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search HUDOC 
collection for ―App. No. 31382/96,‖ then follow ―Case of Kurzac‖ hyperlink). 
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persuasively supported by the case law of European Community courts 
regarding EC measures adopted to give effect to U.N. decisions. As is 
known, European Union Member States (―EU States‖) put into operation 
the measures decided by the Sanctions Committee through EU and EC 
instruments, essentially common positions followed by implementing 
regulations or decisions.
31
 EU institutions also adopt financial sanctions 
autonomously, within the general framework provided by U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, using a similar 
procedure to draw their own nominal lists based on information and 
requests by the EU States.
32
 Individuals and associations on either of the 
two categories of lists in the EU States can seek relief before the EC 
courts. However, according to the judgments of the CFI on the matter, the 
claims result in very different outcomes depending on the origin of the list.  
The Yusuf, Kadi, Ayadi, and Hassan decisions
33
 evidenced that the CFI 
considered its jurisdiction to be precluded by the primacy of U.N. Charter 
obligations over any other international obligations, whether human rights 
treaty obligations or obligations deriving from EU membership.
34
 Security 
 
 
 31. In order to give effect to Resolution 1390 (2002), the EU Council on May 27, 2002, acting 
under the powers conferred by Article 11 of the Treaty of the European Union in connection to 
external relations, adopted Common Position 2002/402/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against 
Osama bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaida organization and the Taliban, and other individuals, 
groups, undertakings, and entities associated with them. Starting with EC Regulation 881/2002 of May 
27, 2002, the EC regulations based on the common positions automatically endorsed the lists without 
submitting their contents to control or revision. The EU Council has adopted several common 
positions and decisions updating both the EU lists and the lists established according to the decisions 
of the 1267 Committee. See Council Decision 2007/868/EC of 20 December 2007 implementing 
Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No. 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain 
persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and repealing Council Decision 2007/445/EC; 
Commission Regulation (EC) No. 760/2007 of 29 June 2007, updating Council Regulation (EC) No. 
881/2002 and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No. 467/2000, 2007/871/CFSP; Council Common 
Position 2007/871/CFSP of 20 December 2007 updating Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the 
application of specific measures to combat terrorism and repealing Common Position 2007/448/CFSP; 
Council Decision 2007/445/EC of 28 June 2007, implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation No. 
2580/2001 and repealing Decisions 2006/379/EC and 2006/1008/EC. 
 32. On the EU listing procedure, see Iain Cameron, European Union Anti-Terrorist Blacklisting, 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 2, 225 (2003). 
 33. See Sandro Cerini, Blacklisting e diritti fondamentali: Il regolamento del Consiglio n. 881 
del 27.5.2002 non sopravvive al vaglio della Corte di giustizia, 30 RIVISTA DELLA COOPERAZIONE 
GIURIDICA INTERNAZIONALE 288 (2008). 
 34. Case T-306/01, Yusuf v. Council of the European Union, 2005 E.C.R. II-3533.  
From the standpoint of international law, the obligations of the Member States of the United 
Nations under the Charter of the United Nations clearly prevail over every other obligation of 
domestic law or of international treaty law including, for those of them that are members of 
the Council of Europe, their obligations under the ECHR and, for those that are also members 
of the Community, their obligations under the EC Treaty. 
Id. ¶ 231. See, e.g., Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council of the European Union, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649, 3712 
¶ 181; Case T-253/02, Ayadi v. Council of the European Union, 2006 E.C.R. II-2139, 2186 ¶ 116; 
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Council resolutions under Chapter VII were considered to be U.N. Charter 
obligations within the meaning of Article 103, by virtue of Article 25.
35
 
Consequently, according to the CFI, ―the resolutions of the Security 
Council at issue fall, in principle, outside the ambit of the Court‘s judicial 
review and . . . the Court has no authority to call in question, even 
indirectly, their lawfulness in the light of Community law.‖36 The 
argument is not particularly convincing if we consider that Article 103 
merely regulates conflict of norms, and that nowhere in the Security 
Council resolutions or the Guidelines of the Sanctions Committee are 
States prevented from receiving complaints from the proscribed 
individuals after they enforce the funds-freezing decisions; there is, thus, 
no conflict between the relevant U.N. binding decisions and the exercise 
of the CFI‘s prerogatives pursuant to the EC Treaty. The conflict may 
indeed arise subsequently, in the event the CFI quashes an EC-
implementing regulation and establishes that funds must be unfrozen, but 
judicial review itself is arguably not barred by the supremacy of U.N. 
Charter obligations. 
Irrespective of the permissibility of judicial review of the U.N. 
decision, the issue arises whether the CFI could exercise jurisdiction over 
EC implementation measures. In that respect, the CFI found that 
Community institutions, bound by the EC Treaty to further EU States‘ 
international obligations, ―acted under circumscribed powers, with the 
result that they had no autonomous discretion.‖37 Consequently, the 
argument goes, EC legislation adopted in order to give effect to the 
Security Council‘s binding resolutions cannot be submitted to judicial 
review before the EC courts either. This contention is even more 
questionable, insofar as a court‘s jurisdiction over EC acts, clearly based 
on the EC Treaty, does not depend on the objective pursued by their 
adoption: it is irrelevant for the purposes of the court‘s jurisdiction if the 
adopting institutions intended to lay the basis for autonomous EC policy or 
to further international obligations. 
 
 
Case T-49/04, Hassan v. Council of the European Union, CFI judgment of 12 July 2006, ¶ 92, 
http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en (search for ―case number T-49/04,‖ then follow 
―T-49/04, Judgment, 2006-07-12‖ hyperlink). 
 35. See Case T-306/01, Yusuf, ¶ 234 (―Primacy extends to decisions contained in a resolution of 
the Security Council, in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations.‖). See also 
Case T-315/01, Kadi, ¶ 184; Case T-253/02, Ayadi, ¶ 116; Case T-49/04, Hassan, ¶ 92.  
 36. Case T-306/01, Yusuf, ¶ 276; Case T-315/01, Kadi, ¶ 225; Case T-253/02, Ayadi, ¶ 116; Case 
T-49/04, Hassan, ¶ 92. 
 37. Case T-306/01, Yusuf, ¶ 265; Case T-315/01, Kadi, ¶ 214; Case T-253/02, Ayadi, ¶ 116; Case 
T-49/04, Hassan, ¶ 92. 
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Apparently in an attempt to offset its deference to the Security Council, 
the CFI sought a compromise solution. The CFI deemed itself 
―empowered to check, indirectly, the lawfulness of the resolutions of the 
Security Council in question with regard to jus cogens, understood as a 
body of higher rules of public international law binding on all subjects of 
international law, including the bodies of the United Nations.‖38 From a 
practical point of view, this solution is of little consequence, since, as is 
known, the number of indisputable jus cogens norms in international law 
is minimal. From a legal point of view, it is, on the other hand, inaccurate: 
the CFI‘s residual competence is misleadingly based on the scope of 
application of a normative source (jus cogens) rather than on rules of 
jurisdiction.
39
 It is true that a causal relationship between jus cogens and 
judicial review, to the effect that jus cogens violations may result in 
immunity from review being lifted, has been established in connection to 
other fields, such as immunity of foreign states from jurisdiction.
40
 
However, in that case, the existence of jus cogens norms applicable to the 
case did not create jurisdiction, but removed the exemption from (pre-
existing) jurisdiction. To put it differently, jus cogens does not create 
jurisdiction where it does not exist; at best, it removes an exemption from 
 
 
 38. Case T-306/01, Yusuf, ¶ 277; Case T-315/01, Kadi, ¶ 226; Case T-253/02, Ayadi, ¶ 116; Case 
T-49/04, Hassan, ¶ 92. 
 39. Indeed, it is one thing to assert that all subjects of international law are bound by imperative 
norms, and a very different one to derive therefrom that a court has jurisdiction over the acts of a legal 
subject as far as the control of conformity to jus cogens is concerned. There has been some doctrinal 
contestation of the basis of the CFI finding to the effect that it could review U.N. acts from a jus 
cogens point of view.  
In the present international legal order, lacking a centralised and fully developed judiciary, it 
is up to the Security Council to decide on the form of legal protection to be included in the 
sanctions regime. . . . [T]he ICJ, the principal judicial organ of the UN, is the only judicial 
organ that potentially has the power to scrutinize Security Council resolutions. . . . It is, 
therefore, unclear on what basis the CFI considered itself competent to ‗check, indirectly, the 
lawfulness of the resolutions of the Security Council‘. 
Ramses Wessel, Editorial: The UN, the EU, and Jus Cogens, 3 INT‘L ORG. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2006). 
 40. See Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, Cass., sez. un. civ., 11 Mar. 2004, n. 5044/04; 
see contra McElhinney v. Ireland, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 37 (2001); Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 
2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79 (2001); Fogarty v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 157 (2001); 
Jones v. Al-Arabiya [2006] UKHL 26 (U.K.) (appeal taken from Eng.). The legal literature on the 
relationship between jus cogens and immunity is quite extensive. See Andrea Bianchi, Ferrini v. 
Federal Republic of Germany, 99 AM. J. INT‘L L. 242 (2005); Pasquale De Sena & Francesca De 
Vittor, State Immunity and Human Rights: The Italian Supreme Court Decision on the Ferrini Case, 
16 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 89 (2005); Lorna Mc Gregor, State Immunity and Jus Cogens, 55 INT‘L & COMP. 
L.Q. 437 (2006); Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the 
Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT‘L L. 741 (2003); Carlo Focarelli, Denying Foreign State 
Immunity for Commission of International Crimes: The Ferrini Decision, 54 INT‘L & COMP. L.Q. 951 
(2005); Emmanuel Voyiakis, Access to Court v. State Immunity, 52 INT‘L & COMP. L.Q. 297 (2003); 
Ed Bates, State Immunity for Torture, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 651 (2007). 
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the default jurisdiction. That said, even if a court lacks jurisdiction over 
the acts of a given body, the possibility of incidental jurisdiction remains 
open to discussion: it might be necessary for a court analyzing an act 
falling within its jurisdiction to first examine the lawfulness of an act 
outside its jurisdiction on which the first act is based. Some authors have 
indeed argued for such a possibility in the case of Security Council 
resolutions,
41
 which would imply their diffuse control by the domestic 
courts of those countries implementing such resolutions in light of 
domestic and international law; however, this solution is not to be 
connected with the personal scope of jus cogens, but with the necessity of 
assessing the lawfulness of the original source of an act before deciding 
the lawfulness of the act itself. Nevertheless, despite this proclaimed self-
restraint, the CFI ultimately took upon itself the task of balancing the 
competing interests involved when it contended:  
In the circumstances of this case, the applicants‘ interest in having a 
court hear their case on its merits is not enough to outweigh the 
essential public interest in the maintenance of international peace 
and security in the face of a threat clearly identified by the Security 
Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
42
  
The above-mentioned judgments, while very few, did lay down a 
consistent pattern for the CFI to follow in cases regarding EC measures 
adopted to give effect to U.N. sanctions in other fields. In the 2007 Minin 
case,
43
 the CFI discussed the claim introduced by an individual on the 
proscription list drawn by the Sanctions Committee for Liberia,
44
 and used 
the same line of argument defined in Yusuf and the other terrorist lists 
cases. The CFI‘s contention was, again, that the preeminence of the U.N. 
legal order over that of the EC limits the control of legality by EC 
judicature, with the exception of jus cogens violations.
45
 
The case law on U.N. proscription lists implemented by the EU has 
developed in sharp contrast with the case law on analogous financial 
sanctions autonomously adopted by the European Union institutions, in 
particular the OMPI judgment of 2006, and the Sison and Sichting 
 
 
 41. See Cannizzaro, supra note 6. 
 42. Case T-306/01, Yusuf, ¶ 344. 
 43. Case T-362/04, Minin v. Council of the European Union, 2007 E.C.R. II-2003. 
 44. At stake were the EC implementation measures of the decisions made by the Sanctions 
Committee established by Resolution 1521 (2003) in connection with the situation in Liberia, 
particularly the funds freezing decisions pursuant to Resolution 1532 (2004). 
 45. Case T-362/04, Minin, ¶¶ 100–101. 
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judgments of 2007.
46
 Absent the jurisdictional barrier, the CFI found that 
the obligation to observe the defense rights of suspects requires the 
institutions to notify the individuals of the reasons leading to the measure 
immediately after it was adopted, and to afford them a fair hearing if they 
so request.
47
 Emphasis was placed on the consequences of the 
disproportionate reliance on confidentiality by the EU institutions, which 
presents two downsides.
48
 First, the denial of access to the information in 
suspects‘ files impairs their right to express their viewpoint on the factual 
elements against them. Also, the courts are not placed in a position to 
perform their supervisory function,
49
 which includes assessing evidence, 
especially when it is the only procedural guarantee of a fair balance 
between individual and collective interests.
50
  
As the latest judgment of the CFI of October 2008 on the new OMPI 
application underscores, the broad discretion enjoyed by the EU Council 
in the sphere of economic and financial sanctions ―does not mean that the 
Court is not to review the interpretation made by the Council of the 
relevant facts‖;51 quite to the contrary, ―where a Community institution 
enjoys broad discretion, the review of observance of certain procedural 
guarantees is of fundamental importance.‖52 On the same occasion the CFI 
also stressed the importance of the accurate revision of the grounds for 
 
 
 46. See Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d‘Iran v. Council of the 
European Union (―OMPI‖), 2006 E.C.R. II-4665; Case T-47/03, Sison v. Council of the European 
Union, 2007 E.C.R. II-73; Case T-327/03, Stichting Al-Aqsa v. Council of the European Union, 2007 
E.C.R. II-79. 
 47. OMPI, ¶¶ 125–126, 137. 
 48. See Stichting, ¶ 61:  
The state of uncertainty in which . . . the applicant has been left, regarding the actual and 
specific reasons for its inclusion in the list at issue, has been exacerbated by the reply given, 
even before this action was brought, to its request for access to all the documents made use of 
by the Council before adopting the decision originally challenged. [Access was denied] on the 
ground that the only document concerned . . . was classified as ‗CONFIDENTIAL EU‘ and 
that its disclosure would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public 
security and international relations. 
 49. See id. ¶ 58:  
[T]he statement of reasons required by Article 253 EC must disclose in a clear and 
unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in 
question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the 
measure and to enable the competent court to exercise its power of review of the lawfulness 
thereof.  
See also OPMI, ¶ 98. 
 50. OPMI, ¶¶ 153–155. 
 51. Id. ¶ 138. 
 52. See Case T-256/07, People‘s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Council of the European Union, CFI 
judgment of 23 Oct. 2008, ¶¶ 137–139, http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en (search 
for ―case number T-256/07,‖ then follow ―T-256/07, Judgment, 2008-10-23‖ hyperlink). 
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maintenance of proscription at regular intervals: the decision to maintain a 
name on the list must be adopted by the EU Council following the 
verification of the existence of a decision taken by a competent national 
authority on the basis of credible evidence.
53
 
Clearly, U.N. and EU sanctions regimes are similar in terms of 
information collection, decision-making process, and impact upon the 
individuals concerned. What accounted for the radically different judicial 
outcome was the sole institutional origin of the proscription list: while the 
CFI upheld fair trial guarantees in EU blacklisting cases, no judicial 
remedy was acknowledged against sanctions resulting from mere 
incorporation of Security Council lists into EU law.  
The creation of a barrier to judicial review for measures implementing 
Chapter VII resolutions found support in the stances of other judicatures, 
whether national tribunals or the European Court of Human Rights.
54
 They 
were based on various legal constructions converging into judicial self-
restraint. One such construction relies on the paramountcy doctrine, 
affirming the prevalence of Security Council resolutions over human 
rights treaties by virtue of Article 103. Thus, in its 2006 Al-Jedda 
decision,
55
 the London Court of Appeal found that action undertaken by a 
multinational force, authorized by a Chapter VII resolution to adopt all 
necessary measures to maintain security and stability in Iraq, falls within 
the scope of Charter ―obligations‖ whose paramountcy is ensured by 
Article 103, and renders obligations arising from the ECHR inoperative.
56
 
In its 2007 judgment on the Al-Jedda appeal case,
57
 the House of Lords 
(―HL‖) confirmed that the detention was not contrary to the right to liberty 
under Article 5, paragraph 1 of the ECHR (and under the U.K. Human 
Rights Act of 1998), because the application of that provision was 
restricted by virtue of the operation of Articles 25 and 103 of the U.N. 
Charter.
58
 According to the HL, the United Kingdom was bound to 
 
 
 53. Id. ¶¶ 177–183. In the particular case, the EU Council had failed to re-evaluate its assessment 
in the light of the finding of the U.K. Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission to the effect that 
the decision of the Home Secretary had been ―unreasonable‖ and ―perverse.‖ Id. 
 54. See infra the case law of U.K. courts, the Court of First Instance of the European 
Communities, and the European Court of Human Rights. 
 55. See R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v. Sec‘y of State for Defence (―Al-Jedda I‖), [2006] 
EWCA (Civ) 327 (Eng.). At stake was the arrest and detention without trial of the plaintiff, on 
suspicion of terrorist affiliation, by British forces acting as part of a multinational force under the 
authority of Security Council Resolution 1546. 
 56. See Al-Jedda I, ¶¶ 77–81. 
 57. R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v. Sec‘y of State for Defence (―Al-Jedda II‖), [2007] 
UKHL 58 (U.K.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 58. See Al-Jedda II, ¶¶ 30–36. 
  
 
 
 
 
642 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 8:627 
 
 
 
 
exercise its power of detention authorized by the Security Council 
wherever necessary for imperative reasons of security.
59
  
Another ground for judicial self-restraint is the equivalent protection 
doctrine, underpinning the presumption of respect for human rights in a 
given legal order, such as the EU or the U.N. Thus, in the Bosphorus 
case,
60
 the decision of the European Court of Human Rights to abstain 
from review was based on the alleged presumption of equivalence in 
human rights protection between the EC legal order and the European 
Convention, coupled with the fact that the respondent EC State had had no 
discretion in the transposition of the relevant EC act.
61
 The ECHR also 
established that this presumption could only be rebutted by manifest 
violations.
62
  
Third, de facto judicial immunity of measures carried out under a U.N. 
Chapter VII resolution is motivated by ―exclusive U.N. imputability,‖ a 
thesis alleging that action required or authorized by the Security Council is 
attributable to the U.N. rather than to the States materially carrying out the 
operations.
63
 The consequence of non-imputability is the paralysis of the 
 
 
 59. See Al-Jedda II. For a brief analysis of the House of Lords judgment, see Alexander 
Orakhelashvili, R (on the application of Al-Jedda) (FC) v. Secretary of State for Defence, 102 AM. J. 
INT‘L L. 337 (2008). 
 60. See Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. Ireland (―Bosphorus‖), 2005-VI Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 113. The case regarded the seizure of an aircraft adopted by the respondent EC State in the 
furtherance of an EC compulsory act implementing a U.N. embargo decision. See Frank Hoffmeister, 
Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirket v. Ireland. App. No. 45036/98, 100 AM. J. 
INT‘L L. 442 (2006). 
 61. See Bosphorus, ¶¶ 152–155:  
The Convention does not, on the one hand, prohibit Contracting Parties from transferring 
sovereign power to an international (including a supranational) organisation . . . . On the other 
hand, it has also been accepted that a Contracting Party is responsible under Article 1 of the 
Convention for all acts and omissions of its organs regardless of whether the act or omission 
in question was a consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with 
international legal obligations. . . . In the Court's view, State action taken in compliance with 
such legal obligations is justified as long as the relevant organisation is considered to protect 
fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms 
controlling their observance, in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that 
for which the Convention provides. 
See also id. ¶¶ 159–165 on the arguments for the presumption of Convention compliance of the 
European Union protection of fundamental rights. 
 62. See Bosphorus, ¶ 156:  
If such equivalent protection is considered to be provided by the organisation, the 
presumption will be that a State has not departed from the requirements of the Convention 
when it does no more than implement legal obligations flowing from its membership of the 
organisation. However, any such presumption can be rebutted if, in the circumstances of a 
particular case, it is considered that the protection of Convention rights was manifestly 
deficient. 
 63. See Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France (―Behrami and Saramati‖), ECHR judgment 
of 2 May 2007, ¶ 151, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search HUDOC 
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treaty-based systems of human rights protection, which do not bind 
international organizations, especially in terms of enforcement 
mechanisms.
64
 In the Behrami and Saramati joint decision,
65
 the European 
Court of Human Rights established that the actions of an international 
security force (such as unlawful detention), or the inactions of a civil 
administration (such as failure to de-mine), are attributable to the U.N. 
when such international presences operate on the basis of U.N.-delegated 
command pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
66
 The ECHR 
derived therefrom that it lacked competence ratione personae to entertain 
the claim.
67
 Putting forward rather questionable argumentation, the ECHR 
considered that the delegation of U.N. Security Council powers to States 
acting collectively was sufficiently clear and limited to maintain the 
central role of the Security Council, despite the evident lack of ―direct 
operational control.‖68 Also, the court failed to address the possibility of 
 
 
Collection for ―App. No. 71412/01,‖ then follow ―Behrami and Behrami‖ hyperlink): ―In the present 
cases, the impugned acts and omissions of KFOR and UNMIK cannot be attributed to the respondent 
States . . . .‖ 
 64. As is known, international and regional conventions aimed at securing fundamental human 
rights include procedures available to individuals (most significantly complaints before judicial or 
quasi-judicial bodies) only as against violations allegedly committed by States parties (Article 1 of the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 34 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, Article 44 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 
Article 22 of the UN Convention against Torture, etc.). If an action by a State party infringing a 
protected right under such instruments is considered attributable to an organization of which that State 
is a member rather than to the State itself, individuals will be deprived of these conventional 
guarantees, for their complaints will be found inadmissible ratione personae. 
 65. The common decision in Behrami and Saramati attributed acts performed by EC States with 
the authorization of the Council (KFOR, UNMIK) to the U.N. as a distinct entity. See Pierre Bodeau-
Livinec et al., Behrami & Behrami v. France; Saramati v. France, Germany & Norway, 102 (2) AM. J. 
INT‘L L. 323 (2008); Paolo Palchetti, Azioni di forze istituite o autorizzate dalle Nazioni Unite davanti 
alla Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo: i casi Behrami e Saramati, 3 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO 
INTERNAZIONALE 681 (2007). 
 66. See Behrami and Saramati, ¶ 151: ―UNMIK was a subsidiary organ of the UN created under 
Chapter VII and KFOR was exercising powers lawfully delegated under Chapter VII of the Charter by 
the UNSC. As such, their actions were directly attributable to the UN, an organisation of universal 
jurisdiction fulfilling its imperative collective security objective.‖ 
 67. See Behrami and Saramati, ¶ 152. 
 68. The Court‘s analysis of the attribution of KFOR actions focused on who exercised ―ultimate 
authority and control,‖ Behrami and Saramati, ¶ 133, and it found that they laid with the U.N., 
considering sufficient the fact that the chain of command reached the Security Council through the 
regular reports of the Secretary General. This interpretation is hardly consistent with the ―effective 
control‖ standard set forth by the International Law Commission for attribution of conduct either to the 
contributing States or the organization (Article 5 of the 2004 Draft articles on the responsibility of 
international organizations). While the Court insisted on the fact that the establishment of KFOR 
constituted an exercise of a Charter-based prerogative of the Security Council, the legal basis and the 
effective control over the operations are two distinct aspects. Since peacekeepers function as double 
organs (national and U.N.), at least the concurrent responsibility of contributing States should have 
been considered. As to the analysis of UNMIK actions, the Court found that, as a subsidiary organ, it 
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subsidiary or concurrent EC State responsibility. The Behrami doctrine 
has been consolidated in subsequent judgments that perpetuate the veil of 
impunity over State action covered by a Chapter VII resolution: Kasumaj 
v. Greece (5 July 2007),
69
 Gajic v. Germany (28 August 2007),
70
 Berić v. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (16 October 2007).
71
 
Against this mainstream dogma, the Kadi appeal judgment delivered by 
the European Court of Justice on 3 September 2008
72
 challenges the myth 
of intangibility (or infallibility, for that matter) of measures aimed at 
implementing U.N. Chapter VII resolutions. 
III. THE KADI APPEAL JUDGMENT: ARTICLE 103 PARAMOUNTCY 
DOCTRINE VS. THE ―EC CONSTITUTIONALITY‖ TEST 
In its appeal judgment of 3 September 2008, the ECJ reversed the Kadi 
and Yusuf decisions of the Court of First Instance, finding that the CFI 
erred in law . . . when it held . . . that it followed from the principles 
governing the relationship between the international legal order 
under the United Nations and the Community legal order that the 
contested regulation, since it is designed to give effect to a 
resolution adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations affording no latitude in that respect, 
must enjoy immunity from jurisdiction so far as concerns its 
internal lawfulness save with regard to its compatibility with the 
norms of jus cogens.
73
  
 
 
was ―institutionally directly and fully answerable to the UNSC.‖ Behrami and Saramati, ¶ 142. While 
in the latter case the margin for interpretation appears wider, it may be argued that the focus on the 
formal qualification of the force should not entirely outweigh the reality on the field, and therefore the 
assessment of factual control. 
 69. Kasumaj v. Greece, ECHR decision of 5 July 2007, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search HUDOC Collection for ―App. No. 6974/05,‖ then follow ―Kasumaj 
v. Greece‖ hyperlink). The Kasumaj case regarded the occupation without compensation of the 
applicant‘s agricultural land by the Greek KFOR contingent, and raised issues under Article 1 of 
Protocol 1, Article 6 para. 1 and Article 13. Id. 
 70. Gajic v. Germany, ECHR decision of 28 Aug. 2007, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search HUDOC Collection for ―App. No. 31446/02,‖ then follow ―Gajic v. 
Germany‖ hyperlink). The facts and alleged violations in Gajic were similar to those in Kasumaj, 
insofar as it concerned deprivation of property by the German contingent of KFOR. Id. 
 71. Berić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, ECHR decision of 16 Oct. 2007, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/ 
tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search HUDOC Collection for ―App. No. 36357/04,‖ then follow 
―Beric and Others‖ hyperlink). The case regarded the responsibility of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
established by Resolution 1031 (1995), for acts of the High Representative who allegedly infringed the 
right to freedom of assembly, fair trial, and effective remedy. Id. 
 72. See Case C-402/05 P, Kadi. 
 73. Id. ¶ 327. 
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In establishing that U.N. mandatory decisions cannot have the effect of 
depriving the court of its competence to review EC legislation 
implementing them, the ruling overturns all prior jurisprudential 
orientations. Not only does the judgment dismantle the legal constructions 
upholding the immunity from review of measures giving effect to Security 
Council‘s Chapter VII resolutions, but it also contains the first judicial 
contestation of the validity of the remedy available at the U.N. level for 
wrongfully proscribed individuals.
74
 The ECJ‘s interpretation of the 
applicability of EC constitutional principles in the presence of what may 
be termed ―reinforced‖ international obligations offers a novel perspective 
on the relationship between legal orders. 
A. The EC Legal Order as a Self-Contained Regime and the 
“Constitutional Control” Value of Judicial Review 
The judgment unmistakably establishes the ECJ‘s competence to 
review any piece of EC legislation, irrespective of its original source (in 
particular, irrespective of whether it has been adopted in the furtherance of 
international obligations).
75
 This finding is based upon a firmly asserted 
autonomy of the EC legal order—which comprises the norms regulating 
the allocation of powers amongst EC institutions—with respect to an 
international agreement.
76
 The implications of EC autonomy, for EC 
courts, are that judicial control over the executive cannot be set aside by 
international commitments, and further, that when legislation is adopted in 
order to give effect to an international agreement, EC institutions are 
bound to secure the basic constitutional values of the EC legal order.
77
  
The international legal order is, thus, construed as a multilayer system 
in which the EC legal order functions as a ―self-contained regime,‖ though 
the term is not explicitly employed. This analysis appears to be 
uncontroversial. The legal literature
78
 and some international case law
79
 
 
 
 74. See the observations regarding the Court‘s assessment of the U.N. re-examination procedure 
at infra, section D point 1. 
 75. See Case C-402/05 P, Kadi, ¶ 278: ―[T]he lawfulness of any legislation adopted by the 
Community institutions, including an act intended to give effect to a resolution of the Security Council 
remains subject, by virtue of Community law, to full review by the Court, regardless of its origin.‖ 
 76. Id. ¶ 282. The reference to the allocation of powers is clearly intended to pinpoint the 
relationship between EC judicature and EC executive organs, particularly the control of the former 
over the latter. 
 77. Id. ¶ 279. 
 78. See Anja Lindroos & Michael Mehling, Dispelling the Chimera of „Self-contained Regimes‟ 
International Law and the WTO, 16 (5) EUR. J. INT‘L L. 857 (2005); Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, 
Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 483 
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have, indeed, acknowledged the existence of special regimes that abide by 
particular legal norms and are monitored by specific tribunals or quasi-
judicial bodies. Such regimes have been especially identified in the areas 
of human rights, international criminal law, environmental law, and 
international trade law. Also, international organizations, such as the 
World Trade Organization or the EC itself, can be brought as examples of 
self-contained regimes insofar as they have their own law-making and 
compliance mechanisms, and both primary rules and rules of 
responsibility are established by the founding treaties rather than by 
international law. The proliferation of special regimes has also been 
recognized by the International Law Commission in its 2006 conclusions 
on the unity and fragmentation of international law,
80
 and the concept was 
already implicit in the 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts.
81
  
The Kadi judgment clarifies the peculiarity of the EC legal order as a 
special treaty-based regime, essentially describing it as grounded on 
impervious fundamental principles (rule of law, fundamental human 
rights),
82
 and autonomous mechanisms designed to ensure that those 
principles are enforced (judicial review). Within this framework, the lack 
of exception to the ECJ jurisdiction is a natural corollary of the principle 
 
 
(2006); Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 
AM. J. INT‘L L. 535 (2001).  
 79. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 
24); Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
 80. See International Law Commission, Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law (2006), http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/1_9_ 
2006.pdf. 
 81. See INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, DRAFT ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES 
FOR INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS (2001), Art. 55 (Lex specialis): ―These articles do not apply 
where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the 
content or implementation of the international responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of 
international law.‖ 
 82. The general principles of EC law, binding EU institutions and member States when they 
implement EC legislation or act within the scope of EC law, are no novelty in the ECJ‘s jurisprudence. 
Though some of them (the duty of cooperation and non-discrimination on nationality grounds) arise 
directly from the EC Treaty, many principles (loyal cooperation, proportionality, legitimate 
expectations, fundamental rights, good administration) have developed by means of jurisprudence, and 
only recently found express recognition as constitutional principles of the EU legal order. See 
ANTHONY ARNULL ET AL., WYATT & DASHWOOD‘S EUROPEAN UNION LAW 235–54 (2006). In this 
case the rule of law itself is indicated as a general principle and as a shield against obligations deriving 
from the interaction with other legal orders. The ECJ‘s approach cannot be said to be farfetched; not 
only can this principle be derived from the common constitutional traditions of member States, but the 
rule of law is implied in the formulation of the task assigned to the EC judicature by Article 220 of the 
Treaty: ―The Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, each within its jurisdiction, shall ensure 
that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed.‖ 
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that the EC is governed by the rule of law.
83
 The ECJ thus establishes a 
necessary relationship between rule of law and judicial review: judicial 
review is not an accessory procedural guarantee that can be set aside by 
strong presumptions of legality or security exigencies, but is an intrinsic 
element of the rule of law. As to the parameters for review, the lawfulness 
of EC acts, including legislation adopted to give effect to international 
commitments, is contingent upon the observance of human rights insofar 
as they are an integral part of EC general principles of law.
84
 
B. The Clash Between the International and EC Hierarchies of Sources 
and an Artifice for Reconciliation  
The view that the EC legal order operates within a fragmented 
international order logically circumscribes the scope of EC judicial review. 
In particular, the EC judicature cannot assess the legitimacy of any act 
emanating from a non-EC legal subject such as the U.N. Security Council. 
In fact, the ECJ warily specifies the extent of its competence, and stresses 
that its review does not regard the original U.N. resolutions, but 
exclusively considers the implementing EC legislation.
85
  
Coherently with the strict distinction between the U.N. and EC orders, 
the ECJ does not advocate for any residual or indirect possibility of review 
of U.N. acts, even from a jus cogens perspective. It thus corrects the 
logical fallacy of the CFI referred to previously.
86
 The position of the ECJ 
appears, in fact, more legally rigorous.
87
 It does not purport to assess the 
validity of U.N. acts and neither does it challenge the primacy of the 
resolution at the international level. Nevertheless, it clarifies that the 
priority of sources is different in international law and EC law. In 
international law, U.N. Chapter VII resolutions supersede all other treaty 
 
 
 83. See Case C-402/05 P, Kadi, ¶ 281: ―[T]he Community is based on the rule of law, inasmuch 
as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid review of the conformity with the basic 
constitutional charter, the EC Treaty . . . .‖ 
 84. Id. ¶¶ 279, 283, 284. 
 85. Id. ¶¶ 286–287. However, further in the judgment, the court ultimately does assess the U.N. 
mechanism, establishing a direct relationship between the lack of an acceptable U.N. re-examination 
procedure and EC exercise of jurisdiction. See supra note 74. 
 86. See supra note 36, Section II. 
 87. Naturally, direct scrutiny of respect for human rights by U.N. bodies would not have been 
technically adequate for a tribunal entrusted with the supervision of conformity to obligations arising 
under a different conventional regime. However, the fact that the EC courts cannot quash a U.N. act 
does not mean the courts cannot analyze their legitimacy according to international law, rather than 
limit their task to assessing EC legitimacy in the wake of such acts. Also, one can hardly make the case 
that an EC act implementing an unlawful act under international law may nevertheless be lawful under 
EC law. 
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obligations, including the EC Treaty and human rights treaties such as the 
ECHR. Under EC law, even ―reinforced‖ international obligations have to 
pass the test of ―EC constitutionality‖: they cannot be implemented if the 
implementation measure—an internal EC act—conflicts with the 
fundamental principles of the European Community.
88
  
To be sure, there exists a prospect of collision between the obligation 
of EC institutions under international law to implement U.N. decisions 
even in case of contrast with other treaty obligations, and the 
subordination of any EC act to EC constitutional principles. In order to 
reconcile these two incompatibly hierarchized sets of norms in the instant 
case, the ECJ uses a legal artifice: the discretion of EC institutions in 
giving effect to U.N. decisions. The court thus acknowledges that the EC 
has an obligation to observe U.N. decisions,
89
 but finds that ―the Charter 
of the United Nations does not impose the choice of a particular model for 
the implementation of resolutions adopted by the Security Council under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, since they are to be given effect in accordance 
with the procedure applicable in that respect in the domestic legal order of 
each Member of the United Nations.‖90 The discretion of States/EU 
institutions in transposing U.N. resolutions according to their domestic 
procedures entails for the court that the impossibility of challenging the 
international lawfulness of U.N. measures does not block the review of the 
internal lawfulness within the European Community of the EC 
implementing act. As a result, the ECJ, unlike the CFI, finds that judicial 
review of the internal lawfulness of the regulations is not barred by the 
primacy of Charter obligations.
91
  
Naturally, once established that the ECJ‘s jurisdiction is strictly limited 
to EC acts, it becomes crucial to determine if the impugned decision is 
attributable to EU States, EU institutions, or to the U.N. Security Council. 
In fact, the Kadi respondents had put forward the argument that the ECJ 
should refrain from reviewing EC acts insofar as they merely further U.N. 
decisions. The ECJ‘s answer to this highly contentious issue is, once more, 
 
 
 88. See Case C-402/05 P, Kadi, ¶¶ 287–288:  
[I]t is not, therefore, for the Community judicature, under the exclusive jurisdiction provided 
for by Article 220 EC, to review the lawfulness of such a resolution adopted by an 
international body, even if that review were to be limited to examination of the compatibility 
of that resolution with jus cogens. However, any judgment given by the Community 
judicature deciding that a Community measure intended to give effect to such a resolution is 
contrary to a higher rule of law in the Community legal order would not entail any challenge 
to the primacy of that resolution in international law. 
 89. Id. ¶¶ 291–296. 
 90. Id. ¶ 298. 
 91. Id. ¶ 299. 
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against the mainstream. It refuses to emulate the ECHR inadmissibility 
decision in Behrami and Saramati based on the non-imputability to the 
responding States of U.N. mandated and authorized conduct.
92
 Conversely, 
it invokes the Bosphorus precedent
93
 to conclude that, in the case of 
blacklisting regulations, jurisdiction—ratione personae—does subsist.94 
According to the court, its jurisdiction is further supported by the 
existence of non-derogable EC legal principles, including rule of law, of 
which judicial review is an intrinsic part.  
C. Reinforced International Obligations and Non-Derogable EC 
Principles: A New Solange Doctrine 
The analysis of the judgment has already evinced that, since the 
European Community treaties have generated a self-contained regime, the 
paramountcy doctrine does not set aside the judicial mechanisms inherent 
in the EC legal order. One might, however, base the immunity of U.N.-
mandated EC measures from review on the possibility to derogate from 
the EC Treaty in order to accommodate international obligations related to 
the maintenance of peace and security. In addressing this hypothesis, the 
ECJ develops a theory of non-derogable principles of EC law. The court 
states that derogations from the EC Treaty (e.g., from the common market) 
are indeed permitted in the furtherance of international obligations;
95
 
nonetheless, no derogation is authorized from ―the principles that form 
part of the very foundations of the Community legal order, one of which is 
the protection of fundamental rights, including the review by the 
Community judicature of the lawfulness of Community measures as 
regards their consistency with those fundamental rights.‖96  
As emphasized above, the ECJ opposes the EC hierarchy of norms to 
the international hierarchy, and suggests that the Charter‘s primacy in 
international law does not entail primacy at EC level. The court further 
specifies that the Charter supersedes any acts of secondary EC law by 
virtue of Article 300 (7) EC, but this does not extend to primary law, and 
particularly to the general principles which include fundamental rights. On 
the contrary, in accordance with Article 300 (6), international agreements 
need to pass a sort of EC constitutional test.
97
 The court thus follows the 
 
 
 92. See supra note 65, Section II.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Case C-402/05 P, Kadi, ¶¶ 312–314. 
 95. Id. ¶¶ 301–302. 
 96. Id. ¶ 304. 
 97. Id. ¶¶ 307–309. 
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conclusions of Advocate General Poiares Maduro on the Kadi appeal case 
presented on 16 January 2008. The Advocate General had rejected the 
respondents‘ contention that U.N. law should prevail over EC legal 
principles by the operation of Article 307 of the EC Treaty, which has the 
effect of safeguarding obligations arising from agreements concluded 
before 1 January 1958, such as the U.N. Charter and its Article 103. 
Instead, he argued that the EC Treaty has engendered an autonomous legal 
order placed in a dualistic relationship with international law. The main 
consequence deriving therefrom is the conditional acceptance of 
international obligations, even those of a strong character such as Article 
103: the EC can legitimately comply with any such obligation only insofar 
as these obligations respect the constitutional values of the municipal legal 
order. From this perspective, Article 307 of the EC Treaty on which 
Poiares Maduro relied could be conceived as a safeguard clause of the 
newly created legal order. In fact, the Advocate General seems to suggest 
that the EC courts somehow fulfill the tasks of a domestic constitutional 
court by ensuring that compliance with international obligations is 
consistent with the fundamental principles on which that particular 
community is based. His reasoning is somewhat analogous to that 
advanced by the German Bundesverfassunsgericht in the well-known 
Solange judgments.
98
 The analogy is supported by the reading of the ECJ 
judgment: the review performed by the court is described as the EC 
equivalent of the constitutional control over executive action performed 
 
 
 98. As is known, in the Solange I judgment, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal 
Constitutional Court] May 29, 1974 (F.R.G.), Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr und 
Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540, 551, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court determined its competence not to apply EC acts in contrast with the fundamental 
rights enshrined in the German Grundgesetz. This decision was motivated by the absence of both a 
democratic legislative body in the EC and an EC ―bill of rights.‖ In the Solange II judgment, 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 22, 1986 (F.R.G.), Re the 
Application of Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft, 3 C.M.L.R. 225, the German Federal Constitutional 
Court considered whether it should suspend its rights-based control over EC acts so long as 
(―solange‖) EC legislation guaranteed the same fundamental rights as the German Constitution, and 
the Luxemburg Court offered sufficient judicial protection at the EC level. This stance was a partial 
reversal of the Solange I judgment, which gave Germany the authority to question all EC law against 
the framework of the national constitution. This solution attempted to reconcile the primacy of EC law 
and the maintenance of the competence of the constitutional judge as a guarantee of respect for 
fundamental human rights. In its 12 October 1993 judgment on the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty, the same court decided it would maintain its function of guaranteeing fundamental 
constitutional rights by not applying EC norms that contrasted with the constitution. Analogously, the 
Kadi opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, and the subsequent ECJ judgment, contend that 
the international obligations must be enforced so long as they do not contrast with the fundamental 
(i.e., constitutional) EC principles, and that EC Courts are the final arbiter of the constitutionality of 
any measure aimed to ensure compliance with international obligations. 
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within domestic legal systems, and, as such, it cannot be impaired by 
international obligations.
99
 
D. The First Judicial Critique of the Terrorism Blacklists Scheme 
1. An Indirect Appraisal of the U.N. Re-examination Procedure in the 
Context of Admissibility 
As emphasized above, the ECJ categorically states that it cannot assess 
the lawfulness of the U.N. decisions. However, it surprisingly does so, 
albeit in an indirect manner, when it discusses whether the U.N. de-listing 
procedure offers the judicial protection guarantees required by EU (and 
arguably international) human rights standards.
100
  
The premises for this discussion are no less surprising. In the light of 
foregoing argumentation to the effect that review is not impaired by the 
supremacy of the Charter on the international plane, the court suggests that 
it may, however, discretionally refrain from review if it is satisfied that an 
effective re-examination procedure exists within the U.N. system. This 
possibility of derogation does not appear coherent with the principle, 
earlier expressed by the court, that the European Community cannot 
abdicate from the pursuance of the rule of law principle, including judicial 
review of any EC act. Admittedly, a U.N. mechanism observing the same 
guarantees could serve as a surrogate for the EC judicature, based on the 
equivalent protection doctrine. It still remains true that such a doctrine is 
not fully consistent with the ECJ‘s emphasis on the autonomy of the EC in 
terms of institutions and procedures. 
As to the existence of equivalent guarantees at U.N. level, the court 
concludes in the negative. ―[I]mmunity from jurisdiction within the 
internal legal order of the Community . . . constituting a significant 
derogation from the scheme of judicial protection of fundamental rights 
laid down by the EC Treaty, appears unjustified, for clearly that re-
examination procedure does not offer the guarantees of judicial 
protection.‖101 Even after the introduction of individual de-listing 
petitions, ―the procedure before [the Sanctions] Committee is still in 
 
 
 99. Case C-402/05 P, Kadi, ¶ 316:  
[T]he review by the Court of the validity of any Community measure in the light of 
fundamental rights must be considered to be the expression, in a community based on the rule 
of law, of a constitutional guarantee stemming from the EC Treaty as an autonomous legal 
system which is not to be prejudiced by an international agreement. 
 100. Id. ¶¶ 319–325. 
 101. Id. ¶¶ 321–322. 
  
 
 
 
 
652 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 8:627 
 
 
 
 
essence diplomatic and intergovernmental, the persons or entities 
concerned having no real opportunity of asserting their rights and that 
committee taking its decisions by consensus, each of its members having a 
right of veto‖; moreover, the working Guidelines ―do not require the 
Sanctions Committee to communicate to the applicant the reasons and 
evidence justifying his appearance in the summary list or to give him 
access, even restricted, to that information,‖ and ―if that Committee rejects 
the request for removal from the list, it is under no obligation to give 
reasons.‖102 Therefore, the reasoning follows, the court cannot abdicate 
from its role of ensuring the review of the lawfulness of the 
implementation measure.  
While the ECJ‘s overall assessment of the procedure from the 
viewpoint of defense rights seems correct, it must be said that its analysis 
does not take into account the updates in the Committee‘s Guidelines 
introduced following Resolution 1735 (2006), as recalled above.
103
 Only 
the ex post facto examination of the concrete application of these new 
provisions can show if the reform has actually led to increased 
transparency, but this procedural amendment should not have been 
disregarded altogether in the court‘s analysis.104  
The conclusion that the ECJ must not derogate from exerting its review 
function is, in any event, tightly connected with the lack of an authentic 
remedy at U.N. level. One cannot help but wonder: does the ECJ then 
suggest that a further reform of the U.N. mechanism might provide a basis 
for immunity from review in the future?  
2. Substantive Findings: Denial of Judicial Protection, and 
Procedural Violation of Property Rights 
The ECJ set aside the substantive findings of the CFI insofar as they 
were the result of a narrow examination, confined to the jus cogens 
criterion, instead of a full examination in the light of the general principles 
of EC law.
105
 Pursuant to Article 61 of the ECJ Statute, it also gave the 
final judgment on the matter,
106
 and found that the right to judicial 
 
 
 102. Id. ¶ 325. 
 103. See supra, Section I. 
 104. Clearly, at the time the CFI decision on Kadi was pronounced, the procedure had not been 
amended, but, interestingly enough, the court‘s assessment refers to the present procedure rather than 
to that existing at the relevant time. In doing so, the court‘s proposed analysis was not exclusively 
intended to support its conclusions for the case at stake, but rather appears to direct policy. 
 105. Case C-402/05 P, Kadi, ¶ 330. 
 106. Id. ¶ 331. 
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protection had been infringed and that a procedural violation of the right to 
property had also occurred.  
The ECJ established that ―the rights of the defence, in particular the 
right to be heard, and the right to effective judicial review of those rights, 
were patently not respected.‖107 The reasoning leading to the conclusion 
that a manifest violation of the rights of defense had occurred outlines a 
proposal for a human rights-compatible blacklisting mechanism:  
[T]he effectiveness of judicial review, which it must be possible to 
apply to the lawfulness of the grounds on which . . . the name of a 
person or entity is included in the list . . . , means that the 
Community authority in question is bound to communicate those 
grounds to the person or entity concerned, so far as possible, either 
when that inclusion is decided on or, at the very least, as swiftly as 
possible after that decision in order to enable those persons or 
entities to exercise, within the periods prescribed, their right to 
bring an action.
108
  
These requirements actually overlap with the findings of the CFI 
regarding the procedures that EU institutions are bound to observe in the 
management of the EU autonomous sanctions.
109
 A unified regime for 
individual sanctions would seem to emerge from the combined reading of 
these two judicial analyses. The adoption of the same treatment would 
indeed be coherent with the analogy of the situations of the proscribed 
individuals, irrespective of the formal authority deciding their inclusion on 
the suspects‘ list. 
The pattern for anti-terrorism sanctions suggested by the ECJ takes into 
account the need for flexibility in enforcing human rights. The court 
concedes that the ―surprise factor‖ is essential for the effectiveness of the 
measures at stake and justifies the postponement of the intervention of the 
court.
110
 It stresses, on the other hand, that the mere fact that an act 
concerns national security and terrorism does not exempt the restrictive 
measures contained therein from judicial review.
111
 It thus goes against the 
trend inaugurated by the ECHR in Behrami and the CFI in Kadi according 
to which judicial review would in any event interfere with the political 
endeavor to maintain peace and security. According to the ECJ, the task of 
 
 
 107. Id. ¶ 334. 
 108. Id. ¶ 336.  
 109. See the CFI judgments in the OMPI, Sison, and Stichting cases, supra note 46. 
 110. Case C-402/05 P, Kadi, ¶¶ 338–340. 
 111. Id. ¶ 343. 
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EC judicature is to apply, in the course of judicial review, techniques 
which accommodate, on the one hand, legitimate security concerns about 
the nature and sources of information utilized and, ―on the other, the need 
to accord the individual a sufficient measure of procedural justice.‖112 This 
view is in line with the well-established jurisprudence of the ECHR on 
national terrorism, requiring a fair balance to be struck between security 
concerns and fundamental rights of suspected individuals.
113
 
The ECJ‘s assessment of the blacklisting mechanism as currently 
designed is motivated by the mechanism‘s two main pitfalls. One is the 
absence of a procedure for communication to the individuals concerned of 
the evidence that led to their inclusion on the list and the consequent 
freezing of funds.
114
 The other deficiency, tightly connected with the 
former, is the lack of a procedure for enabling the suspects to make their 
viewpoint known within a reasonable period after the adoption of the 
measure.
115
  
The right to a fair trial is not the only right the ECJ considers to be 
infringed. In fact, the secrecy of the procedures also impacts two-fold the 
right to an effective legal remedy: (1) appellants do not have an 
opportunity to argue their case properly before EC judicature insofar as 
they are not adequately informed of the factual evidence against them, and 
(2) the court itself is not positioned to assess the lawfulness of the measure 
in the specific cases.
116
 Consequently, the ECJ found that ―the pleas in law 
raised by Mr. Kadi and Al Barakaat in support of their actions for 
annulment of the contested regulation and alleging breach of their rights of 
defence, especially the right to be heard, and of the principle of effective 
judicial protection, are well founded.‖117 
As far as the right to property is concerned, the ECJ emphasizes that it 
is comprised in the general principles of EC law, but is not an absolute 
one. Its exercise ―may be restricted, provided that those restrictions in fact 
 
 
 112. Id. ¶ 344. 
 113. See, amongst the latest authorities, Saadi v. Italy, ECHR judgment of 28 Feb. 2008, 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search HUDOC Collection for ―App. No. 
37201/06,‖ then follow ―Case of Saadi‖ hyperlink). On the balancing criteria used by the ECHR in 
terrorism cases, see Carmen Draghici, International Organisations and Anti-Terrorist Sanctions: No 
Accountability for Human Rights Violations?, 2 CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 293 (2009). 
 114. Case C-402/05 P, Kadi, ¶¶ 345–347. This objection might be mitigated by the obligation of 
notification placed by Resolution 1735 (2006) on the State of nationality and residence. The actual 
access by individuals to the relevant information in their files will have to be assessed from case to 
case, as the designating State unilaterally decides what information is publicly releasable. See supra, 
Section I. 
 115. Id. ¶ 348. 
 116. Id. ¶¶ 349–351. 
 117. Id. ¶ 353. 
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correspond to objectives of public interest pursued by the Community and 
do not constitute, in relation to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and 
intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of the right so 
guaranteed.‖118  
In analyzing whether the impugned measure amounted to 
disproportionate interference, the ECJ observes that the freezing measure 
is a ―temporary precautionary measure which is not supposed to deprive 
those persons of their property,‖ but, due to its general and prolonged 
application, it does constitute a ―considerable‖ restriction.119 Referring to 
the case law of the ECHR, the ECJ sets the task of determining ―whether a 
fair balance has been struck between the demands of the public interest 
and the interest of the individuals concerned‖; similarly, it acknowledges 
that ―the legislature enjoys a wide margin of appreciation, with regard both 
to choosing the means of enforcement and to ascertaining whether the 
consequences of enforcement are justified in the public interest.‖120  
The result of the ECJ‘s assessment is that the freezing of funds is 
neither an inappropriate nor a disproportionate measure vis-à-vis the aim 
of fighting the threat to international peace and security posed by 
terrorism.
121
 The court also takes into account circumstances that mitigate 
the effects of the interference. On the one hand, there are the humanitarian 
exceptions allowing for funds designed to cover basic expenses, and the 
possibility of authorization of ―extraordinary expenses‖ by the Sanctions 
Committee.
122
 On the other hand, there is the existence of periodic re-
examination of the lists at the U.N. level, as well as the possibility of 
direct petitions by individuals for review.
123
 
However, the ECJ stresses that an interference with the right to the 
enjoyment of property must also meet procedural criteria in order to be 
deemed lawful. In particular, the person concerned has to be provided with 
―a reasonable opportunity of putting his case to the competent 
authorities.‖124 Absent the necessary procedural guarantees, the 
circumstances of the cases disclosed, according to the court, an unjustified 
restriction of the appellants‘ right to property.125 The ECJ decides, 
accordingly, that the relevant regulation has to be annulled insofar as it 
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concerns the appellants. Nonetheless, it finds that the annulment with 
immediate effect could compromise the effectiveness of the measure, 
whereas its adoption against the appellants might have been otherwise 
appropriate.
126
 Thus, it decides that the measure shall be maintained for 
three months after the delivery of the judgment, so that the EU Council 
may have an opportunity to redress the infringements found.
127
 
The analysis put forward by the ECJ in order to ascertain the violation 
of due process rights and the procedural violation of the right to property 
contains useful indications as to how the terrorism blacklisting scheme 
should be reformed in order to pass the EC legality test. Insofar as the 
human rights principles invoked by the court do not have an exclusively 
European significance, these findings can be also considered as 
suggestions for U.N. reform of the mechanism with a view to ensuring 
international legality.  
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Paradoxically, the Kadi appeal judgment illustrates both the 
interdependence and the mutual resistance of legal orders in the 
contemporary world. On the one hand, by founding the constitutional 
parameters of EC legality not exclusively on EC Treaty provisions but also 
on the common legal traditions of EC States and on international treaties, 
such as the ECHR, the judgment appears to uphold the view of a 
homogeneous legal phenomenon, in which barriers between formal 
sources are fading out. The attempt to preserve the international normative 
hierarchy theory, centered on Article 103 of the U.N. Charter and 
confining the controversy to the EC implementation of Security Council 
resolutions, also points in the same direction. Nonetheless, the Kadi 
philosophy by no means suggests that the various legal sources of human 
 
 
 126. Id. ¶ 373. The substantive examination of the case by the ECJ does not aim at establishing 
guilt or exonerating the appellants. Therefore, the court does not exclude that the conduct of the 
appellants might have actually required the adoption of financial sanctions. It merely states that, in any 
event, the targeted individuals should be able to argue their case before a competent authority.  
 127. Id. ¶¶ 372–376. The ECJ does not offer concrete solutions as to how the EU institutions 
might proceed, though any such solution was arguably to include a review mechanism. Following the 
Kadi judgment, the European Commission provided the suspects with the U.N. Sanctions Committee‘s 
narrative summaries of reasons for their inclusion on the proscription list. After examining the 
litigants‘ comments on those reasons, the Commission passed Regulation 1190/2008 of 28 November 
2008, confirming the presence of Kadi and Al-Barakaat on the list. However, on 30 December 2008 
the Commission published the announcement 2008/C330/09 to the attention of persons and entities 
listed by the latest EC Regulations, in which suspects are informed that they may ask the Commission 
to reveal the factual grounds for their inclusion on the list, and challenge the regulations before the 
CFI.  
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rights obligations contribute to the creation of universal norms, binding on 
non-EU States, or on other international organizations, such as the U.N. 
and their decision-making bodies. Quite to the contrary, the court 
maintains an approach inspired by a fragmented view of the legal 
phenomenon, and focuses only on EU institutions.  
The strength of this dualist paradigm, underpinning the conception of 
the EC as a self-contained regime, is that the EC legal order cannot be 
permeated by external obligations that are less protective of human rights 
and inconsistent with rule-of-law expectations. Conversely, the weakness 
of this stance is that it promotes a fragmentary vision of international law 
as a container for various regimes, each carrying its own set of principles, 
and thus fails to support the affirmation of universal human rights values 
enforceable in any circumstances under international law.  
However, against the background of previous jurisprudence, it does 
have the undeniable merit of setting a bold precedent. At first glance, the 
moderate finding that procedural guarantees have to be added to the 
mechanism in the implementation phase at the EC level does not clash, in 
principle, with EC States‘ superior obligation, deriving from U.N. 
membership, to freeze the funds of listed individuals. Yet, if the 
evidentiary burden is not met for the EC review body, and individuals are 
de-listed at the EC rather than at the U.N. level, the collision between 
obligations becomes unavoidable. In that event, the primacy of U.N. 
commitments, which the ECJ attempts to leave undisputed, largely 
remains a mere theoretical concession.
128
 Arguably, whether purposely or 
not, the Kadi judgment provides support for the legitimacy of 
disobedience before Security Council decisions impairing human rights.
129
 
 
 
 128. The impression is that the ECJ wants to ―have its cake and eat it, too.‖ The court‘s two major 
contentions, the supremacy of U.N. decisions and the need to render them compatible with EU 
principles in the implementation phase, might be theoretically compatible, but the prospect for 
application is very slim. The court does not specify what the expectations from the EU Council are, but 
since the most critical issue on which the annulment is based is the absence of an avenue of appeal, 
presumably the Council ought to offer an opportunity for re-examination. One such means might be 
the establishment of an ad hoc panel for review, before which individuals can be heard immediately 
after their funds have been frozen. Thus, if, at EC level, the review panel finds that the factual basis for 
proscription is lacking—which is not unlikely, given the limited and discretionary public disclosure of 
information required by Resolution 1735 (2006) from the designating State—then the implementation 
act is annulled, and the U.N. binding decision infringed. In such a scenario, the clash between a U.N. 
and a EU decision becomes inevitable. The acknowledgment of the supremacy of a U.N. decision 
means that, in cases of conflict with a EU decision, the U.N. decision prevails. Whereas in practice, the 
U.N. decision will apparently be upheld only as long as there is no conflict. 
 129. This judgment may indeed set a precedent for domestic review of U.N. decisions, and for 
disobedience in case of conflict with national constitutional principles. In fact, there is no reason to 
assume that, outside the EU, States uti singuli cannot raise the objection of their fundamental laws in 
order to exert control over U.N. proscription measures. This may lead to a generalized disapplication 
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Certainly, the creation of self-contained regimes defending their 
constitutional principles may not be a comprehensive answer to the need 
of reforming the U.N. practice in such a way as to make the new self-
attributed competences of the Security Council compatible with the human 
rights standards endorsed by the U.N. itself. Yet, in as much as it 
represents an authoritative critique of the blacklisting mechanism from a 
human rights perspective, it might serve as an incentive for U.N. internal 
reform. Not least because, while formally not challenging the U.N. 
resolutions, such a line of jurisprudence casts serious doubts on the 
lawfulness of the U.N. procedures in terms of human rights consistency, 
and eventually has a negative impact on the credibility of the Security 
Council.  
Due to its innovative emphasis on EC constitutional values as a filter 
even before reinforced international law obligations, the Kadi ruling is 
bound to have further judicial and political echoes. While its effectiveness 
in terms of changing international counter-terrorism patterns is yet to be 
seen, from the viewpoint of a universal human rights discourse, the Kadi 
appeal judgment remains, perhaps, a missed opportunity. 
 
 
of the sanctions regime, or in any event, to a lack of certainty as to the implementation of sanctions. 
Therefore, the most efficient solution would be a reformed U.N. mechanism for listing and de-listing, 
so that U.N. decisions may be fully observed by States, absent constitutional legitimacy concerns. 
 
